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Plethora of scientific papers and articles from the official literature have examined
the vulnerabilities of health care system in the United States, e.g. [Grubaugh
and Santerre, 1994], [Spithoven, 2009] and [Lorenzoni et al., 2014]. Based on a
Bloomberg1report, in 2015, annual health care per capita expenditures in the US
were approximately $9,146, with only two countries surpassing this number; Nor-
way and Switzerland with $9,715 and $9,276 per capita respectively. The author,
by assigning a health-care efficiency score to 55 high-spending OECD countries,
used three weighted metrics; life expectancy, health-care costs per-capita and med-
ical costs as a percentage of GDP. The United States was placed 50th out of 55
countries. But the Bloomberg report is not the only one addressing the imbalance
between the quality of health care services provided in the United States and the
corresponding cost at which they are offered. [Garber and Skinner, 2008], applied
cross-country comparisons of administrative expenses between the US and a group
of peer countries and tried to explore these disparities by addressing the issue of
productive and allocative efficiency. The authors argue that this inefficiency is
primarily due to “a predominantly fee-for-service system of reimbursement, cou-
pled with few supply-side constraints fueling the rapid adoption and diffusion of
technological advances”.
It is widely accepted that a huge variety of wasteful practices should be consid-
ered as the major part of the aforementioned problem. [Berwick and Hackbarth,
2012], present six factors for the total cost of waste, which concern not only pri-
vately insured US citizens but also those insured by Medicare and Medicaid; (i)
failure of care delivery and (ii) coordination, (iii) overtreatment, (iv) administra-
tive complexity, (v) pricing failure and lastly (vi) fraud and abuse. The authors
1Source: Moffat, A., R., ”Health-Care Check-Up: Whose System Is Least Efficient?”,
Bloomberg, November 30, 2015
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found that more than 20% of the total healthcare expenditures is due to the com-
bined waste from these estimates. It is a clear conclusion that efficient treatment
methods are paramount in order to substantially lower costs.
Future trends regarding high-value care are at least ominous. Contemporary
findings [CMS, 2016a] suggest that, by 2025, expenditures related to health care
are projected to grow at an average of 5.8 percent each year and the health care
cost as a percent of GDP is estimated to rise from 17.5 percent in 2014 to 20.1
percent in 2025. At the same time, both state and local governments are estimated
to increase their total medical spending by 2 percentage points; from 45 percent
in 2014 to 47 percent in 2025. Additionally, from 2017 to 2019, health care spend-
ing growth will accelerate and average 5.7 percent, with this number reaching the
alarming 6 percent in the next five years. Thorough analysis has been conducted
regarding payers’ demographic and social characteristics, as well as the type of
their health coverage. Both the privately insured and Medicaid (and Medicare)
patients, are projected to experience increased medical expenditures; especially in
terms of Out-Of-Pocket expenses, which is defined as the amount of money insur-
ance does not cover and must be paid by an individual on its own. Prescription
drugs, hospital spending and expenditures on physician and clinical services are all
anticipated to increase in the long-term as well. The above arguments justify why
policymakers, scientists and researchers have raised concerns about the continuous
increase of medical expenditures in the United States and its consequent impact
on the domestic economy.
1.1 Research Hypotheses
This paper studies the effects of a cost reducing initiative undertaken by CMS
and has two objectives. The first one is to examine whether in areas where BPCI
policies were implemented, individuals reported on average lower out of pocket
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and total medical expenditures. Secondly, it investigates whether the impact of
this policy was even larger among the most vulnerable population groups, such
as the economically disadvantaged individuals (people reporting income less than
$25,000), the elderly (people older than 64 years old) and those who meet both of
those criteria; the elderly poor. Individuals who belong to these population groups
are of particular interest. Low-income individuals or elderly people are more likely
to experience health problems that require medical services while at the same time
are less able to afford needed care due to their low-income. In terms of cost we
expect people living in areas where and when BPCI policies were implemented to
report lower health care costs.
In order to examine whether bundled payment policies had a positive impact
on vulnerable population groups, data from the Annual Social and Economic Sup-
plement of the Current Population Survey and the Center for Medicare and Med-
icaid Services were used. To evaluate the impact health care policy reforms had,
a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimation method is used, popular in the sci-
entific literature when we want to evaluate the effect of policy changes [Athey
and Imbens, 2006]. Difference-in-differences estimation consists of identifying a
specific treatment, by comparing the difference in outcomes before and after the
intervention for groups affected by the intervention to the same difference for un-
affected groups [Bertrand et al., 2004]. Here, the “treatment” refers to policies
being run and tested by CMS. The treatment group consists of people living in
counties where such policies were implemented. People living in counties where
BPCI policies were not tested are the control group.
The rest of this paper is structured in the following way. In subsection 1.2 the
BPCI initiative is described in detail. Section 2 is a summary of previous findings
regarding the impact that bundled payment policies have on cost reduction, the
difficulties which exist when trying to estimate these effects and an analytic de-
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scription of reasons that justify the need to reassess the current payment model.
Moving on, in section 3 I present the datasets I rely on. Section 4 and 5 detail
the tools that are used and the obtained results respectively. In Section 6 and 7,
conclusions and limitation of this research are presented. All figures, tables and
regression results obtained by my analysis, along with descriptive statistics for the
data used, are presented in the Appendix.
1.2 The BPCI Initiative
In 2013, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation Services (CMS), launched
the Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) program. The objective of
this initiative is to examine whether bundled payments can actually reduce Medi-
care’s cost and whether they are able to improve the quality of care that is deliv-
ered.
Bundled payment is defined as a per-episode reimbursement model under which
different physicians, hospitals and post-acute care centers receive a predetermined
payment amount designed to cover the expenses for all services provided for an
episode of treatment for a specific medical condition [Antonova et al., 2015]. Pay-
ment can be made before, during, or after an episode of care [Friedberg et al.,
2015]. Thus, BPCI model aims to extend the principle of prospective payment to
a package of services that spans multiple providers and extends for longer periods
of time. The amount of services delivered during an episode of care is defined as
a bundle and varies by model [CMS, 2016b]. By the time this study was con-
ducted, BPCI Model 1 (Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay) is excluded from
our analysis since, data regarding this model were not available from CMS. The
remaining three models of this initiative are described below:
• The Model 2 bundle includes the triggering hospital stay and all profes-
sional and post-discharge services delivered within a 30, 60 or 90 day period.
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Individual providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis with retrospective
reconciliation against a predetermined target price.
• The Model 3 bundle starts once a patient is admitted to an episode-
initiating post-acute provider following hospitalization, including all services
within the designated period of 30, 60 or 90 days. Unlike the previous model,
Model 3 includes only the post-discharge services and any readmission within
the designated period of time.
• Lastly, the Model 4 bundle includes the anchor hospital stay and profes-
sional services along with any readmissions that may occur within 30 days
of discharge. Contrary to Models 2 and 3, awardees are paid a prospec-
tively determined amount and they, in turn, pay the providers involved in
an episode.
We also extend the BPCI terminology list by introducing two more key terms.
An Episode Initiator (EI), is defined as the participating hospital where a BPCI
Model is implemented. An Episode of Care (EoC), is triggered by an inpatient hos-
pitalization for one of the 48 BPCI clinical episodes, defined by patient’s Medicare
Severity Diagnosis Related Group (MS-DRG) or it begins upon patient’s admission
to a post-acute care setting.
Models 2, 3 and 4 have some key differences that are worth noting. The
most important one is in episode-based payment methods. For both Models 2
and 3, payment is retrospective. Medicare makes fee-for-service (FFS) payments
to providers, practitioners and suppliers who offer medical services to beneficia-
ries. Total payments for a beneficiary’s episode is reconciled against a bundled
payment predetermined by CMS. For Models 1, 2 and 3, CMS firstly relies on
patients’ historical spending in each organization that participates. It then sets a
target price for each EoC, paying at Medicare’s FFS rates. Thereafter, it checks
whether, for each episode, actual spending exceeds this target price; if it does not,
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CMS provides organizations with additional payments and organizations which ex-
ceed this price, return the excess amount back to the organization [Mechanic and
Tompkins, 2012]. On the other hand, payment methods under Model 4 scheme
are prospective; CMS, instead of proceeding to an Inpatient Prospective Payment
System, offers a fixed, predetermined bundled payment during a hospitalization
and possible readmissions within thirty days.
BPCI policy is implemented in two phases. During the first phase, also called
preparation period, which ended on August 5th, 2014, 2,368 potential Awardees
(entities which assume financial liabilities for the episode spending) submitted
applications to CMS. Subsequently, phase I participants move on to the second
phase of the program, also called ”the risk-bearing” phase, during which, they have
to complete execution of an agreement with CMS. From phase I, 1,306 participants
made it to phase II.
2 Literature Review
The voluntary bundled-payments program was officially launched in 2013. Under
this initiative, hospitals, Post Acute providers, physicians and other health-related
professional organizations assume risk for total spending relative to a target price
for up to 48 episodes of care, which account for 70% of total Medicare spending.
Given that medical expenditures rise at a fast pace, there is no need to question
why policymakers focus on discovering methods which aim to reduce costs and
simultaneously deliver better quality health care services. The bundled payment
approach is simple. Under the assumption that the reduction of volume of services
delivered leads to reduced spending, multiple providers are reimbursed a single
sum of money related to an episode of care. In mathematical notation, as [Desisle,
2013] demonstrates, a generalized bundled payment formula can be depicted as
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shown in Eq. (1) below:




where, we let A denote hospital payments (Part A), B is the total number of
physician payments (Part B) and X is the “reduced negotiated reimbursement
price” driven by participation in the bundled payment model. On the contrary,
under the current Medicare fee-for-service payment model, health care providers
are reimbursed for each service they provide.
2.1 The Downside of FFS System
Several studies have highlighted the falacies in FFS system, since it leads to higher
costs and sometimes also results in sub-optimal quality. Yet, it has been the
dominant form of reimbursement in the US for decades. This set of vulnerabilities
are worthy of thorough examination.
The most difficult barrier that policymakers have to face is handling an exten-
sive list of codes which is linked to the type of services provided by physicians or
nursing facilities. This makes it almost unmanageable, due to the depth of its de-
tail. This practice complicates their effort to measure the unit of service provided
each time, creating substantial administrative costs related to coding [Chernew,
2011]. However, even when this problem is overcome, there is a lack of incentive
for taking initiatives and implementing innovative policies on behalf of providers.
This argument relies on the fact that less provided services imply lesser earnings.
[Steele et al., 2015], showed how the FFS model makes it difficult to practice
innovative, advanced medical procedures, justifying why it is important to reform
the existing payment system. The authors initially present two techniques that are
applied to patients with liver cancer. The first one (balloon occlusion) is a method
proposed by them while the second technique (coil embolization) is widely used
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by other physicians. Even though their technique was associated with lower cost,
similar patient outcomes and faster procedure times relative to the other one,
it failed to gain widespread acceptance due to a significant decrease in hospital
and physician revenue under the existing FFS system. The authors conclude that
switching to the most efficient treatment, the one they proposed, under the existing
system is not possible as it leads to loss of profits.
The adoption of Medicare’s Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) model by Congress,
in 1997, in an effort to address increasing spending on certain services, has been
proven to be unsustainable. This inefficiency is what led Congress to repeal SGR
and initiate procedures to implement payment reforms [Steinbrook, 2015]. How-
ever, fee reduction is not a panacea. Even if both private and public payers see a
reduction in fees, spending may rise, due to increased utilization [Chernew, 2010].
Primarily driven by volume, FFS payment scheme leads to overtreatment, services
that would not be needed otherwise, sometimes coupled with poor outcomes. On
top of that it limits collaboration and coordination of all participants.
A survey conducted in 2015 by Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS)
[Noel-Miller, 2015], highlights the variation of OOP medical expenditures for bene-
ficiaries in the FFS program. Relying on a panel survey of 11,000 Medicare benefi-
ciary respondents, in 2011 alone, Medicare insured individuals reported on average
an increase in their OOP expenditures of approximately $3,500 or 20 percent of
their median spending as a percentage of income. They also noted that under an
FFS payment scheme, significant differences occur in terms of OOP health care
spending, based on insurers’ demographic attributes. Indicatively, women were
found to spend more than men, OOP spending increases significantly as people
age and Whites pay more than any other race or ethnicity. Even in cases where
beneficiaries had supplemental insurance, reported OOP expenditures were higher.
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2.2 Review of Bundled Payment Schemes
Following the creation of the inpatient prospective system, in 1983, Medicare began
paying a fixed amount per inpatient hospital stay, based on the patient’s diagnosis.
The first integrated bundled payment project was launched in 1991 by the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Service and concerned Coronary Artery Bypass
Graft (CABG) surgeries [Mechanic, 2016], for all hospitals and services provided
to patients within the hospitalization period and any readmissions within 90 days.
The project lasted for five years and seven hospitals participated in it. Upon its
completion, the program evaluation found a 10% decrease in Medicare spending,
along with a significant reduction in death rates. Since then, CMS has initiated
plenty of other BP programs with mixed results. For example, in 2009, it be-
gan a three-year hospital-physician collaboration program, but the agency did not
find significant increase in Medicare cost savings. That same year, CMS launched
the Acute Care Episode (ACE) Initiative, which lasted for three years, achieving
approximately $600 savings per EoC.
[Froimson et al., 2013], studied whether, aligning the financial incentives of
hospitals and surgeons could be achieved by evaluating the Acute Care Episode
Demonstration project which was initiated in 2009 by CMS and lasted for three
years. They used one and two-year data, based on an extensive financial docu-
mentation regarding all the services offered, for two MSAs cities; Albuquerque,
New Mexico and Tusla, Oklahoma. After the completion of this pilot program
scientists compared their findings, based on data following the start of the ACE
project, relative to baseline values. Their findings were at least promising; in both
cities their was a 7-10% total cost reduction per episode, along with an increase
in hospital revenue. Also, each hospital managed to reduce the overall length of
stay (LOS) for patients who underwent a knee/hip replacement surgery. The cor-
responding cost reduction led to surgeons receiving bonus payments, ranging from
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$275 to $450 per EoC, accounting for up to 25% of the professional fee [Rana and
Bozic, 2014]. These results clearly demonstrate a better financial performance and
also certify that better collaboration between hospitals and medical professionals
leads hospital centers to improve patient care.
Encouraging results were found by [Carey, 2014] as well. Using data from the
State Inpatient Database and supplemental files for revisit analysis, for Medicare
beneficiaries older than 65 years old, the author investigated the relationship be-
tween the probability of discharge of readmission from an Acute Care Hospital
(ACH) and the patient’s length of stay. Comparing the expected cost of readmis-
sion with an additional day of stay, she finds that the cost of an additional day of
stay is approximately 15% lower than the expected cost of readmission. This find-
ing has important policy implications, mainly for hospitals where bundled payment
schemes are tested.
Previous bundled payment demonstrations suggest that the application of epi-
sode-based payment methods delivered by beneficial effects. Prominent examples
like Cardiovascular Care Providers Inc., Medicare Participating Bypass Center
and ProvenCare Demonstrations resulted not only in reduction of Out-of-Pocket
expenses but also delivery of top-quality medical care and an overall reduction in
hospital charges [Shih et al., 2015].
The implementation of bundled payment methods has faced many challenges
as well. Despite the fact that various episode-based payment models have been
launched and tested for more than 40 years, little evidence exists in the official
literature regarding their efficiency. This is mainly due to the complexity of the
system implementation and the difficulty to draw firm, robust conclusions. Plenty
of research papers have already addressed the complexity when transitioning from
one model to the other.
[Hussey et al., 2011], evaluated how well the PROMETHE-US Demonstration
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Project performed during the first two years of its implementation by the Health
Care Incentives Improvement Institute, in 2009. This pilot program was designed
to pay for all of the multiple services provided during a clinical episode. The
authors presented six challenges that needed to be addressed before implementing
any bundled payment methods: (i) a precise description of the services included
in the bundle, (ii) a clear definition of the payment method, (iii) implementation
of quality measurement, (iv) determining accountability, (v) engaging providers to
participate in this process and finally (vi) care redesign coupled with improvements
in care delivery. Taking into account all these details, providers, physicians and
other parties will then be able to carefully avoid complications.
[Bozic et al., 2013] demonstrate some of the challenges that were previously
presented, by examining bundled payments in Total Joint Arthroplasty procedures.
Using data on payments to all Medicare providers for TJA EoC, authors highlight
the importance of quality monitoring under bundled-payment scheme. Because the
data used by the authors varied widely in terms of patient, procedure and hospital
characteristics, safe and generalized conclusions regarding the benefits of bundled-
payment policies were difficult to establish. However, as they conclude, thoroughly
breaking down all services delivered during an episode is mandatory in order to
test the feasibility of bundled-payment reforms. Similar findings were also reported
by [Cram et al., 2015] who highlighted many of the complexities of implementing
bundled payment reforms for elective primary Total Knee Arthroplasty (TKA)
procedures.
Under the precondition that hospitals are financially responsible for post-acute
care delivered by providers, [Lau et al., 2014] examined existing post-acute hospital
referral networks for Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNF) and Home Health Agencies
(HHA). The authors relied on a complete set of non-managed Medicare hospital,
nursing home and home health discharges with datasets containing details re-
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garding hospitals’ certain characteristics and SNF/HHA referrals, which by 2008,
accounted for 2.4 millions in total across the US. The authors point major dif-
ficulties that hospitals faced in an effort to coordinate their financial incentives
with Post-Acute Care (PAC) providers. This phenomenon occurs mostly because
hospitals, being financially responsible for the PAC services delivered to their pa-
tients, must smoothly cooperate with providers, supplying them with continuous
updates throughout the implementation of pilot programs.
It is evident that the literature in bundled payment reforms gains ground con-
stantly. Irrespectively of the complexity of this health care reform, evidence re-
garding the quality of care delivered, coupled with cost reduction under bundled-
payment schemes is encouraging. Decreased readmission rates at hospitals, reduc-
tions in spending levels by reducing the use of costly post-acute care services and
better health-care provided to patients are sound examples of the positive effect
BP reforms have on a broad range of health-care outcomes.
3 Data & Summary Statistics
In an effort to examine the impact BPCI policies have on health-care expenditures,
I use two datasets. The first dataset comes from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services website. It provides us with data concerning the Health Care
Organizations (HCO) where various EoC took place and BPCI Models 2-4 were
tested. This dataset contains useful information regarding 11,178 episodes of care
that took place during the implementation of this pilot program in 1,302 counties,
out of 3,144 ones across the United States.
The second dataset consists of individual-level, observational data and were
obtained from Current Population Survey (CPS). I use the Annual Social Eco-
nomic Supplement (ASEC) CPS dataset files, which are widely used in the official
literature and are issued jointly by the US Census Bureau and the Census Bureau
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of Labor Statistics (BLS) annually. The CPS-ASEC data set contains various de-
mographic, socioeconomic and health related variables. Given that BPCI program
was launched in 2013, I rely on cross-sectional, ASEC-CPS data files for the last
six years; from 2011 up to 2016.
In my analysis, Out of Pocket (OOP) Medical Expenditures and Total Health
Expenditures (THE) are the dependent variables with mean values equal to $4,195
and $3,014 respectively. Individuals who are less than 40 years old and live in
non-metropolitan counties are dropped from the dataset, in an effort to have a
more homogeneous sample, in terms of medical expenses. In addition, I omit
observations with county FIPS codes equal to zero as these countries are suppressed
in CPS public use data for reasons of confidentiality. Our full and finalized sample
consists of 213,058 observations. The dataset is composed of an almost equal
number of males and females, with males representing 47 percent of it and the
remaining 53 percent corresponding to females. Decomposing race variable, Whites
outnumber all other races combined2 as they account for approximately 55 percent
of our sample. As with previous studies, certain demographic variables such as
age, educational attainment, marital status etc. are included. A full description of
the explanatory variables that are used, along with the dependent variables, can
be found in Appendix, Table 1
[Appendix: Tables, (Tab. 1)]
Given that the full, finalized sample consists of 368 counties, we end up with 198
treated counties where BPCI policies were implemented. Fig. 1 in the Appendix
depicts the places where BPCI Models were run and tested, from a state-level
perspective.
[Appendix: Figures, (Fig. 1)]
2African Americans, Hispanics, Asians and others
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4 Empirical Model & Estimation Methods
As mentioned above, one of the objectives of this paper is to examine whether, in
counties where BPCI policies were implemented, health care expenses decreased.
In this context, the following empirical model is specified:
(ME)st = β0+αiXst+β1(time)t+β2(treat)s+β3((time)t∗(treat)s)+λt+ξs+εst (2)
In Eq. (2), dependent variable ME is twofold, as it refers to both OOP and
Total medical expenditures. Vector X consists of predictors that are commonly
used in the official literature as explanatory variables when examining health care
costs. Continuous variables age, its square and discrete variables gender, race,
marital status, educational attainment, income and region compose parameter
vector α. It consists of eight coefficients, each one of them corresponding to the
appropriate predictor. λt and ξs are used to control for time and county effects
respectively and εst is the error term. In addition, I let, treats and timet, denote
two dichotomous variables.
Variable treats, refers to the counties where BPCI policies were either imple-
mented or not; 0 represents counties which were excluded from the implementation
and 1 represents counties that participated in the program. Variable timet “splits”
the six-years period into two separate ones, also called the pre- and post- treat-
ment periods. The “treated” group, is exposed to a “treatment” during the second,
three-year period (also called post-treatment period) while counties belonging to
the “control” group are not exposed to the treatment during either period. Note
that, the coefficient of the interaction term between timet and treats, β3, is of
primary interest.
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4.1 Two Part Regression
Using nonlinear regression methods for cost driven data is a common practice.
Particularly in the area of Health Economics Research, the main reason for apply-
ing generalized linear models is, not only to overcome problems of skewed data but
also to deal with zero mass issues (excess number of zeroes present in a dataset)
[Malehi et al., 2015]. [Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972] were the first researchers to
propose the use of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) as an appropriate method
of handling observations with highly skewed distribution. Since then, they are
widely used in the field of Health Economics and in studies which involve non-
normal dependent variables. Hence, due to the fact that I rely on a dataset which
consists of a large number of zero observations, a single index model for such types
of observations is not desirable. Instead, our attention turns into exploiting the
advantages that Two-Part (2PM) regression models[Belotti et al., 2015] offer in
cases when mixed discrete-continuous outcomes are studied [Matsaganis et al.,
2008].
Two-Part models have been extensively used in the official literature. [Mi-
haylova et al., 2010] reviewed the widespread use of these models in healthcare
resources and costs. Since the 1970s, scientists have demonstrated their usage in
a broad range of topics; from meteorology, e.g. [Cole and Sherriff, 1972], to topics
related to health care. While tempting, dropping observations with zero outcome
does not fully expose the impact treatments, policies or other covariates have on
the entire population, including those who report zero values. Thus, incorporating
those zero outcomes in an analysis, help us evaluate the correct treatment effects
and/or incremental effects of covariates. Two-part models offer this flexibility and
this is why they are preferred over single-equation estimation techniques, e.g. OLS.
The first part of a 2PM regression is a binary choice model for the probability
of observing a positive outcome versus a zero one. In this case, a logistic regression
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analysis is used,
Pr(yi > 0) =
exp (βxi)
1 + exp (βxi)
=
1
1 + exp (−βxi)
(3)
letting yi denoting positive or zero medical expenditures. Thus, for individuals
who report zero, either OOP or total expenditures, let yi = 0 and for those who
report positive ones, yi = 1.
For the second part, conditional on a positive outcome, an appropriate GLM
regression model is fit for nonzero, positive medical expenditures. A log natural
link function, g(µi) = log(µi), is used along with Gamma distributional family.
4.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
When observing outcomes for different groups of two or more time periods, DiD
estimation method is used extensively in order to estimate treatment effects. This
is accomplished by comparing the pre- and post- treatment differences in the out-
come of a treatment and a control group. Leaving aside cases with multiple time
periods and control groups, I focus on the conventional case of this technique using
two groups (a control and a treatment one) and two periods of time. This setup,
which is also used by other authors, e.g. [Meyer, 1995] and [Blundell and Macurdy,
1999], helps me exploit the advantages difference-in-differences method offers, as
discovered by [Ashenfelter and Card, 1985].
4.2.1 Linear DiD Model
For each observation, i, let Gi = {0, 1} and Ti = {0, 1} denote group and time
indicators respectively as well as their interaction term, Gi ∗ Ti. Gi equals to one
when an observation belongs to the treatment group. When Ti = 1, observation
refers to the post-treatment period. Hence, treatment effect, τDiD, is defined as,
τDiD = E[Y 1|T = 1, G = 1,X]− E[Y 0|T = 1, G = 1,X], (4)
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while, the participation in the treatment is defined by Eq. (5),
I = T ∗G = 1[T = 1, G = 1] (5)
Assuming we estimate an equation, linear in parameters, of the form:
Y = β′X + γ1T + γ2G+ γ3(T ∗G) + ε (6)
Based on Eq. (5) and (6), when treatment occurs, we have that E[Y 1|T = 1, G =
1, X] = β′X + γ1 + γ2 + γ3, while for the unobserved (counterfactual) outcome
we have that E[Y 0|T = 1, G = 1,X] = βX + γ1 + γ2. Treatment effect is then
identified as τDiD = γ3.
Due to the structure of the dataset and the estimation method I use, applying
a nonlinear DiD model is imperative.
4.2.2 Nonlinear (Logit) DiD Estimation
The difficulty of directly interpreting τDiD relies on the fact that treatment ef-
fect is bounded between 0 and 1, group effects are not constant across time and
correspondingly time effects are not constant between groups. A solution Puhani
proposes to the above issue is to assume that the difference between groups across
time periods is constant to the unobserved latent linear index rather than the
limited dependent variable[Puhani, 2011].
In cases like the one I examine, when a Logit regression model is used and
based on Eq. (4), the “Logit DiD” estimation is:
E[Y |T,G,X] = F (β′X + γ1T + γ2G+ γ3T ∗G) (7)
where, F (•), is the transformation function. When Logit regression techniques
are applied, the probability of dependent variable, yi, taking value 1 is modeled as
P (yi = 1|xi) = F (x
′
iβ), where F (•) is a single linear index satisfying the following
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properties: (i) F (−∞) = 0, (ii) F (∞) = 1 and (iii) ∂F (z)/∂z > 0, z = x′iβ,
mapping the single index into the [0, 1] space.
Interpreting the coefficient of T ∗ G, γ3, in “logit DiD” models requires extra
caution. The sign is equal to the one of the treatment effect since transformation
function, F (•), is strictly monotonic. Hence, it can be immediately interpreted,
certifying whether treatment effect exists or not. Yet, the magnitude of the coeffi-
cient of γ3 can not be interpreted as in the conventional, linear DiD models since
treatment effect is estimated as shown in Eq. (8) below:
τ(T = 1, G = 1, X) = F (β′X + γ1 + γ2 + γ3)− F (β′X + γ1 + γ2) (8)
Eq. (8) relies heavily on the fact that, as Puhani states, in any nonlinear model
with a strictly monotonic function, F (•), Treatment Effect is “the cross differ-
ence of the conditional expectation of the observed outcome, E[Y 1|T,G,X], minus
the cross difference of the conditional expectation of the counterfactual outcome,
E[Y 0|T,G,X]”. In cases where, coefficient γ3 6= 0, Treatment Effect is the incre-
mental effect of the coefficient of the interaction term, γ3.
It is essential to fully present the procedure that is followed in order to estimate
τDiD in Eq. (8). Since Stata is the statistical software that is used for econometric
analysis, we fully take advantage of the margins postestimation command with one
major difference in the regression equation. Instead of specifying interaction term,
T ∗G, directly in the regression, a pre-specified interaction variable is created. This
new variable is then evaluated at T = 1, G = 1 providing the appropriate estimates
with the corresponding standard errors. In terms of my analysis and the regression
model that is used, evaluating the incremental effect on β3 is accomplished by
specifying the values of covariates, timet and treatc, to be equal to 1.
18
5 Results
For the two types of Medical Expenditures (ME), Out of Pocket and Total, both
parts of the two-part model regressions are shown in the Appendix,
[Appendix: Tables, (Tab. 2, 3, 4, & 5)]
Based on the analysis presented in Section (4), Table (7) is extremely important
as it helps us quantify treatment effect and, consequently examine whether the
hypotheses that are under investigation are true.
All tables presented in Appendix, consist of four columns. The first one shows
results based on original population (full sample). The remaining three columns
refer to estimates over three different subsamples; (i) elder people (older than 64
years old), (ii) these who are poor (with income equal or less than $25,000) and
lastly (iii) a combination of those two criteria, elders with low income. Tables
(2) - (5) report estimated coefficients. In particular, Tables (2) and (4) concern
estimates for the Logit part of the Two-Part model to predict the probability of
positive medical expenditures, and Tables (3) and (5) refer to the GLM regression
coefficients to predict the level of expenditures for those who have reported more
than zero.
5.1 Medical Expenditures
In most cases estimates obtained for both types of Medical Expenditures (ME)
demonstrate the expected associations. Both for the first and second part of re-
gressions, the vast majority of the explanatory variables maintain a plausible sign,
attaining statistical significance at all conventional significance levels. Indicatively,
for the first part, as shown in Table (2), individuals who are older, females, highly
educated, have higher income or live in the region of Midwestern United States,
were likely to report positive health care expenditures, holding all other variables
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constant. On the other hand, individuals who are married, are less likely to report
positive ME. Lastly, relative to Whites, all other races are more likely to declare
zero OOP and Total ME. Findings are aligned with those of scientific literature.
Most variables keep their sign and significance when running the second part
of the two-part model3. Given that for the GLM part, a log-link function has
been used, conditional mean has an exponential form. Thus, coefficients can be
directly interpreted as percent changes4. Looking at Column (1) on Table (3),
which corresponds to full sample, with each additional year of age, (OOP) ME are
expected to increase by 3.8 percents. Similarly, females spend 1.3% more on health
care relative to males and Hispanics spend on average 18.5% less than Whites. The
rest of the coefficients are interpreted similarly.
The crux of this paper relies on the results shown in Table (7). The estimates
presented on this table, reveal the true effect of BPCI initiative, implemented by
CMS in the “treated” counties and during the post-treatment period. For all four
samples, looking at Table (7), the sign of estimated coefficient of the interaction
term, (timet) ∗ (treatc), henceforth β̂3, is negative. The sign itself certifies that in
areas where this policy was implemented, residents of those counties reported on
average lower costs, for both OOP and Total ME. Interpreting these results, in
counties where bundled payment reforms were implemented, people older than 64
years old were found to have reduced OOP ME by $180 (an 8% reduction) and
Total ME by $123 approximately (a 13% reduction). In a similar manner, reduced
spendings were found both for low-income individuals and those who are poor and
older. For example, people with income less than $25,000 and who are older than
64 years old, reported on average less ME than those who live in counties where
3Although variations, in terms of sign and statistical significance are still present; for example
coefficients of variable (Region) or Gender.
4For example, assuming that β̂1 is the estimate of coefficient β1, the percent change of β1,
ceteris paribus, equals to exp(β̂1)− 1
20
BPCI policy was not implemented. Table (8) reflects the positive impact BPCI
policy had on areas where it was implemented.
[Appendix: Tables, (Tab. 8)]
The rest of estimated coefficients reported in Table (7) can also be interpreted this
way.
6 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness of Results
In order to check the robustness of my results, numerous other regression models
were tested. The most important results obtained from these analyses are reported
in Table (7). For ease of interpretation and convenience, estimates for all other
independent variables apart from β̂3, which concern the DiD treatment effect esti-
mator, are not shown. The first regression model, Model (I)5, corresponds to Eq.
(1) without the parameter vector, αi. Model (II), includes only age, gender and
income as explanatory variables while for Model (III), all covariates are included
except for the year effects, in order to not omit year 20166. Regression analy-
ses were conducted both for the full sample and the three predefined subsamples.
However, estimates obtained from regressions based on full sample provided us
with insignificant results and they are not shown.
Regardless of specification, relying on estimates presented on Table (7), it is
evident that estimated coefficient, β̂3, is consistent in terms of maintaining its
negative sign and for being statistically different from zero. Small differences with
respect to its magnitude are apparent, however such variations are small for both
types of medical expenditures. Apart from examining the effect BPCI policy had
on elders and poor people, a separate analysis was conducted for the disabled
persons, without finding significant results.
5first row of Table (7)
6Inclusion of year effects, both for the baseline regression and for all other specification models
leads to omission of 2016, the last year of the BPCI pilot program, due to collinearity
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Before applying the estimation methods I presented above, various other mod-
els were run and tested as well; for example, log-Linear estimation methods were
used with individuals reporting zero ME being dropped from this set of regressions.
Even though such an approach has a comparative advantage when it comes to in-
terpreting the DiD treatment effect coefficient, it leads to biased and inconsistent
estimators due to the nature of data used. Results for such types of regressions
are excluded and not shown in this paper.
Given that both dependent variables had highly-skewed distributions and deal-
ing with zero-mass problems was inevitable due to the nature of my dataset, Two-
Part models offer the ability to relax both the assumption of heteroscedasticity and
normality when it comes to obtaining consistent estimators [Cameron and Trivedi,
2009]. The set of explanatory variables that were used in the aforementioned
analysis do not violate the assumption of exogeneity.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate whether BP methods have positive impact
in counties where such policies were tested. Using a combination of CMS and
ASEC-CPS datasets, statistically significant results were drawn for individuals
with low socioeconomic status, living in “treated” counties. With Out-of-Pocket
and Total Medical Expenditures as the outcomes of interest, the analysis conducted
above found reduced health-care expenses in areas where Bundled Payment reforms
were launched and tested. To the extent of my knowledge, there were no other
programs being tested during the three-year, post-treatment period I study.
Certain limitations needed to be overcome while conducting this analysis. On
the data side, the datasets that were used provide limited information with re-
spect to individuals’ medical expenses. This phenomenon restricted my analysis
as I could solely rely on just two dependent variables. Despite the fact that MEPS
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data files provide us with detailed description of US residents’ ME, this alternative
was not possible. For reasons of confidentiality, MEPS datasets do not include in-
formation regarding the residence of respondents, thus it would not let me merge
those files with the dataset provided by CMS. Repeating this analysis based on
more detailed health-care expenditures would have multiple advantages and pro-
vide policymakers with even more insightful results. On the estimator side, two
important things need to be mentioned. Firstly, since BPCI is an ongoing process,
my study examines the effect it has for only two years post program’s initiation7.
Future analyses could exploit data for more years ensuring an even better, more
robust evaluation of BP reforms. Secondly, given the survey design and the fact
that individuals are interviewed, there may be circumstances when survey ques-
tions are misunderstood by respondents. Thus, classical measurement error is a
concerning factor when dealing with data derived from such surveys.
In summary, this study contributes solidly in the existing literature. Firstly,
it empirically demonstrates Puhani’s famous paper for estimating and evaluating
DiD treatment effects in nonlinear settings. From a policy perspective and to the
extent of my knowledge there are no other studies that have examined Bundled
Payment Reforms, both from a county level perspective as well as in terms of
certain population characteristics. Evidently, the encouraging results being found,
have important implications for policymakers. The aforementioned concrete esti-
mates strengthen the argument to transition from a widely-applied FFS payment
scheme to bundled payments, especially since such implications positively affect
certain, vulnerable population groups.
7Note that the post-treatment period used in this analysis refers to a three-year period, but
the inclusion of year effects implies the omission of final year, 2016.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K
(n=213,058) (n=57,265) (n=96,798) (n=34,535)
Variable Mean [SD] Mean [SD] Mean [SD] Mean [SD]
Age
57.199 73.67 59.734 74.45
[12.104] [6.376] [12.948] [6.431]
Age2
3418.3 5468 3735.8 5583.8
[1474.1] [954.7] [1606.8] [966.5]
Female
0.533 0.565 0.658 0.660
[0.499] [0.496] [0.474] [0.473]
Race
White Reference Reference Reference Reference
Black
0.114 0.142 0.157 0.155
[0.318] [0.349] [0.363] [0.362]
Hispanic
0.114 0.116 0.121 0.127
[0.318] [0.321] [0.326] [0.333]
Other
0.199 0.154 0.259 0.199
[0.399] [0.361] [0.438] [0.399]
Married
0.363 0.447 0.420 0.479
[0.429] [0.497] [0.494] [0.499]
Education
No HS diploma Reference Reference Reference Reference
HS diploma
0.443 0.474 0.501 0.505
[0.497] [0.499] [0.500] [0.499]
Ass. Degree
0.093 0.069 0.079 0.063
[0.289] [0.254] [0.270] [0.244]
Bachelor’s
0.197 0.149 0.125 0.101
[0.398] [0.356] [0.331] [0.301]
Master’s +
0.129 0.118 0.055 0.057
[0.335] [0.322] [0.228] [0.231]
Income







≤ 100, 000 0.067 0.037
[0.250] [0.100]
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K





Northeast Reference Reference Reference Reference
Midwest
0.135 0.128 0.121 0.119
[0.341] [0.333] [0.327] [0.324]
South
0.318 0.325 0.321 0.333
[0.466] [0.468] [0.467] [0.471]
West
0.357 0.349 0.373 0.353
[0.479] [0.477] [0.483] [0.478]
Post*Treated
0.319 0.333 0.316 0.325
[0.466] [0.471] [0.465] [0.469]
OOP ME
2187 2179 1516 1758
[4195] [4469] [3805] [4667]
Total ME
805 960.8 698.6 813
[3016] [3727] [3110] [4161]
In parentheses, standard deviation is reported for both the ex-
planatory and dependent variables
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Results for OOP ME
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K
Variable (n=212,698) (n=55,457) (n=96,220) (n=32,764)
Age
0.563∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.055) (0.010) (0.074)
Age2
-0.0003∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0009∗
(0.00008) (0.0003) (0.00009) (0.0005)
Female
0.267∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.035) (0.017) (0.038)
Race
White Reference Reference Reference Reference
Black
-0.352∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.090) (0.044) (0.099)
Hispanic
-0.430∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗ -0.480∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.109) (0.069) (0.124)
Other
-0.360∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.480∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.058) (0.039) (0.066)
Married
-0.161∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.035) (0.028) (0.041)
Education
No HS diploma Reference Reference Reference Reference
HS diploma
0.362∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.049) (0.024) (0.051)
Ass. Degree
0.551∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.080) (0.039) (0.092)
Bachelor’s
0.597∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.068) (0.052) (0.077)
Master’s +
0.640∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.102) (0.069) (0.128)
Income







Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K
Variable (n=212,698) (n=55,457) (n=96,220) (n=32,764)







Northeast Reference Reference Reference Reference
Midwest
0.292∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.079) (0.064) (0.112)
South
-0.491∗∗∗ -0.850∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.032)
West
0.748∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.106) (0.838) (0.128)
Post*Treated
-0.039 -0.180 -0.120 -0.172
(0.094) (0.128) (0.110) (0.152)
No of Clusters (Logit) 360 307 350 283
In parentheses, robust standard errors reported, adjusted for clustering
at the county level. In addition, (*) declares statistical significance at
the 10% Significance Level, (**) at the 5% SL and lastly, (***) at the
1% SL. In all four regressions county and year effects are included
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Table 3. Generalized Linear Regression Results for OOP ME
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K
Variable (n=191,366) (n=52,144) (n=82,104) (n=30,429)
Age
0.038∗∗∗ -0.029 0.054∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.005) (0.025) (0.006) (0.032)
Age2
-0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0003∗∗∗ 0.00007
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0002)
Female
-0.013∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ -0.011 0.027∗
(0.002) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Race
White Reference Reference Reference Reference
Black
-0.231∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.0248) (0.024) (0.030)
Hispanic
-0.170∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.034) (0.035) (0.046)
Other
-0.254∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.028) (0.027) (0.036)
Married
-0.062∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024)
Education
No HS diploma Reference Reference Reference Reference
HS diploma
0.197∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.035)
Ass. Degree
0.319∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.050) (0.033) (0.054)
Bachelor’s
0.332∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.038) (0.035) (0.047)
Master’s +
0.402∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.044) (0.047) (0.059)
Income




Continued on next page
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K











Northeast Reference Reference Reference Reference
Midwest
0.133∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.0266) (0.036)
South
0.072∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.020
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
West
0.187∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.042)
Post
0.88∗∗∗ 0.002 0.121∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.031) (0.036) (0.027) (0.044)
Treated
0.042∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.009) (0.046)
Post*Treated
-0.025 -0.081∗ -0.100∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.041) (0.040) (0.049)
No of Clusters(GLM) 368 308 368 367
In parentheses, robust standard errors reported, adjusted for cluster-
ing at the county level. In addition, (*) declares statistical significance
at the 10% Significance Level, (**) at the 5% SL and lastly, (***) at
the 1% SL. In all four regressions county and year effects are included
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Results for TME
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K
Variable (n=213,058) (n=57,135) (n=96,777) (n=34,428)
Age
0.073∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.087∗
(0.006) (0.040) (0.006) (0.047)
Age2
-0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0006∗
(0.00006) (0.0002) (0.00005) (0.0003)
Female
0.322∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.021) (0.015) (0.028)
Race
White Reference Reference Reference Reference
Black
-0.253∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.042) (0.030) (0.051)
Hispanic
-0.263∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.069) (0.049) (0.076)
Other
-0.318∗∗∗ -0.371∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.041) (0.028) (0.048)
Married
-0.283∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.028) (0.021) (0.033)
Education
No HS diploma Reference Reference Reference Reference
HS diploma
0.331∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.033) (0.021) (0.036)
Ass. Degree
0.475∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.055) (0.038) (0.063)
Bachelor’s
0.563∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.053) (0.038) (0.059)
Master’s +
0.615∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.058) (0.051) (0.077)
Income
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K











Northeast Reference Reference Reference Reference
Midwest
0.476∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.047) (0.043) (0.059)
South
-0.024∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.104∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017)
West
0.834∗∗∗ 1.29∗8∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.061) (0.056) (0.063)
Post*Treated
-0.032 -0.061 -0.098 -0.051
(0.062) (0.074) (0.069) (0.076)
No of Clusters (Logit) 368 368 365 351
In parentheses, robust standard errors reported, adjusted for clustering
at the county level. In addition, (*) declares statistical significance at
the 10% Significance Level, (**) at the 5% SL and lastly, (***) at the
1% SL. In all four regressions county and year effects are included
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Table 5. Generalized Linear Regression Results for TME
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K
Variable (n=153,043) (n=42,357) (n=61,290) (n=23,744)
Age
0.073∗∗∗ 0.007 0.060∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.005) (0.040) (0.008) (0.052)
Age2
-0.0005∗∗∗ -0.00003 -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0001
(0.00004) (0.0003) (0.00006) (0.0003)
Female
0.048∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.011 0.039
(0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.026)
Race
White Reference Reference Reference Reference
Black
-0.213∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.031) (0.046)
Hispanic
-0.225∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.043) (0.041) (0.061)
Other
-0.237∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.039) (0.037) (0.051)
Married
-0.037∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030)
Education
No HS diploma Reference Reference Reference Reference
HS diploma
0.066∗∗∗ 0.055 0.067∗∗ 0.077∗
(0.030) (0.040) (0.032) (0.041)
Ass. Degree
0.200∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗
(0.042) (0.060) (0.053) (0.075)
Bachelor’s
0.172∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.047) (0.041) (0.054)
Master’s +
0.255∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.055) (0.063) (0.079)
Income
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K











Northeast Reference Reference Reference Reference
Midwest
0.073∗∗∗ 0.023 0.072∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.027) (0.032) (0.041)
South
-0.046∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.014) (0.009) (0.018)
West
0.189∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.076∗ -0.265∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.043) (0.045) (0.54)
Post*Treated
-0.060∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.144∗∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.058) (0.068)
No of Clusters(GLM) 368 367 368 367
In parentheses, robust standard errors reported, adjusted for cluster-
ing at the county level. In addition, (*) declares statistical significance
at the 10% Significance Level, (**) at the 5% SL and lastly, (***) at
the 1% SL. In all four regressions county and year effects are included
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Table 6. “DiD” Treatment Effect for both OOP and Total ME
Marginal Effects Full Sample Age≥65 Inc<25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K
∂y
∂x |OOPME
-63.653 -180.045∗∗ -173.769∗∗∗ -211.165∗∗
(76.292) (83.547) (67.395) (83.191)
∂y
∂x |TME
-51.660 -123.095∗∗ -104.868∗∗ -122.141∗∗
(45.132) (54.44) (42.860) (57.317)
N(OOP) 212,698 55,457 96,220 32,764
N(TME 213,058 57,135 96,777 34,428
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Treatment effect in a
Logit, Difference-in-Difference model, τDiD, is the incremental
effect on the Prespecified interaction term, (treat)i ∗ (time)i*,
evaluated at (treat)i=1 and (time)i=1. The desired result is
obtained by evaluating marginal effects and then measuring the
instantaneous change in the interaction term
Table 7. “DiD” TE according to Specification Models presented in Sec. 6


































In parentheses, Standard Errors reported. For Model (I), parame-
ter vector has been excluded, for Model (II) the parameter vector
consists of age, gender and income and in Model (III) year effects
are not included. Number of Observations are the same as the ones
reported on Table (6)
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Table 8. Percent Reduction in Medical Expenditures, (ME).
Exp. Age≥65 Inc.< 25K Age≥65 & Inc<25K
(OOP) 8.03% 4.7% 11.6%
TME 12.9% 15.0% 14.8%
* Percentages are calculated based on results reported
in Table (6) in the Appendix and mean values of Medical




Figure 1. Number of BPCI Models Run at The State-Level
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